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Revisiting the Client Conundrum:
Whom Does Lawyer for a Government Represent, and
Who Gives Direction to that Governmental Lawyer?
(Answer: The Governmental Entity is the Client, and Most of the Time
Someone Else is Giving the Orders—Not the Lawyer)
Hugh Spitzer*
University of Washington School of Law
Foster Pepper PLLC
The issue of identifying a government attorney’s client is age-old, and
Washington’s Rules of Professional Conduct provide somewhat different answers for
lawyers who are government employees and for those who are with private firms. The
matter becomes even more interesting when a government entity’s attorney is a
publicly-elected legal official: an attorney general, prosecuting attorney, or city attorney
in the case of Seattle and a number of other cities around the country. Others have
written thoughtful pieces on the topic from a national perspective,1 and there is at least
one excellent but slightly outdated piece by District of Columbia municipal attorney
Wayne Witkowski that focuses on the issue in Washington State.2
This paper reviews the key professional responsibility rules and Washington
cases that affect the analysis, and updates Witkowski’s work with a discussion of
Goldmark v. McKenna,3 Seattle v. McKenna,4 and various other materials. It observes that
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Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law. Professor Spitzer teaches Local
Government Law, State Constitutional Law, and Professional Responsibility. He is also a public finance
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this paper discussing alternative models of client identification. The views expressed in this paper are the
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1 Wayne Witkowski, Who is the Client of the Municipal Government Lawyer? (Municipal Law Institute,
2007, PLI No 10925); Ivan Legler, Once Again: Choosing the Model that Determines Who Are the Municipal
Attorney’s Clients (NIMLO [IMLA] 1994).
2 Wayne Witkowski, Thoughts on Who is the Client of an Elected State Attorney General, Prosecuting
Attorney, and City Attorney (Symposium Paper presented at The Prosecutorial Ethic: A Tribute to King
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3 172 Wn.2d 568, 259 P.3d 1095 (2011).
4 172 Wash.2d 551, 259 P.3d 1087 (2011).
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Washington State, like many states, follows the “entity model” of identifying public
lawyers’ clients. That means that the governmental entity itself is the client—the State, a
county, or a city, for example. But within that model, it is still necessary to identify the
“duly authorized constituent” or “representational authority” who may serve as the voice
of the client for an attorney. Who that authorized representative is will depend in large
part on the situational facts and the relevant statutory framework. In most circumstances a
lawyer for a governmental entity (including an elected law officer) should look to another
person as the authorized representative of the client for policy direction. In narrow
circumstances, usually determined by statute (or by charter in the case of a city attorney),
the elected law officer will himself or herself be the authorized representative of the
governmental client. While on a day-to-day basis we continue to think of the relevant
government agency through its duly authorized constituent, as the “client.” But we should
keep in mind that usually the entire governmental entity is the ultimate client.

Question:
Answer:

What are the Relevant RPCs?
Lots of Them! (Here are a Few)

Almost all of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPCs”) apply to state
and local government attorneys practicing here, including, importantly, confidentiality and
conflict-of-interest rules. The following are arguably the RPCs most directly relevant to the
issue of whom a public lawyer represents.
Preamble and Scope
Comment [18] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and
common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning
legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For
example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the
government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment.
Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's
attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be
authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal
controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private
clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.
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RPC 1.0(e) “Informed Consent”
(e) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct.
RPC 1.0(c) “Firm”
(c) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional
corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers
employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other
organization.
Proposed Comment [13] to RPC 1.0(c)
[13] An office or subdivision of an organization employing lawyers who are appointed or
assigned to represent indigent members of the public is considered a separate law firm if it
is fully independent from other units of the organization including physical separation and
no shared access to client information.
[This proposed new Comment [13] to RPC 1.0 was approved on March 19, 2015, by the
WSBA Board of Governors, for submission to the State Supreme Court for the Court’s
consideration.]
RPC 1.2: Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer
(a) [A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation
and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly
authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision,
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial
and whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does
not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities.
RPC 1.4. Communication
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision of circumstance with respect to which the
client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
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(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives
are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when
the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
RPC 1.11(d). Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees
(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently
serving as a public officer or employee:
(1) is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and
(2) shall not:
(i) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially
while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate
government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed writing; or
(ii) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as
lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and
substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative
officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b)
and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).
(Emphasis added)
Comment [2] to RPC 1.11
Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (d)(1) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has
served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former
government or private client. Rule 1.10 is not applicable to the conflicts of interest
addressed by this Rule. Rather, paragraph (b) sets forth a special imputation rule for former
government lawyers that provides for screening and notice. Because of the special
problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) does not
impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the
government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it
will be prudent to screen such lawyers.
(Emphasis added)
Comment [5] to RPC 1.11
[5] When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a
second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another
client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a city and subsequently is
employed by a federal agency. However, because the conflict of interest is governed by
paragraph (d), the latter agency is not required to screen the lawyer as paragraph (b)
requires a law firm to do. The question of whether two government agencies should be
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regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the
scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13, Comment [9].
RPC 1.13 Organization as Client
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization,
and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to
do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and
appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization.
(h) For purposes of this Rule, when a lawyer who is not a public officer or employee
represents a discrete governmental agency or unit that is part of a broader governmental
entity, the lawyer's client is the particular governmental agency or unit represented, and
not the broader governmental entity of which the agency or unit is a part, unless:
(1) otherwise provided in a written agreement between the lawyer and the
governmental agency or unit; or
(2) the broader governmental entity gives the lawyer timely written notice to the
contrary, in which case the client shall be designated by such entity. Notice under this
subsection shall be given by the person designated by law as the chief legal officer of the
broader governmental entity, or in the absence of such designation, by the chief executive
officer of the entity.
(Emphasis added)

The above-quoted RPCs clearly presuppose that any lawyer (including an elected
law officer) has a client, and that there is some “authorized constituent” with whom the
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public lawyer can consult, and who can then make “informed decisions” and communicate
decisions concerning the objectives of representation.

Question:
Answer:

Who is the Client of a Lawyer for a Local Government?
Surprise! It’s Usually the Entire Local Government

Who is the client of a public lawyer? The “entity model” is clearly followed in
Washington, but it is but one of a number of theories of legal representation that have
been considered by legal professionals.5 Under the entity model, the lawyer has
principally the organization as a client, and not its individual elected officials,
department heads, agents or other constituents (including the elected law officer
himself or herself). Legler, citing Hazard & Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, 387.6 This is
the dominant approach in the United States for corporations and other entities that are
not natural persons—particularly since the corporate scandals that led to the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002,7 and changes to the ABA’s Model Rules in response to SarbanesOxley. As discussed below, the entity model has been formally adopted as the standard
in the State of Washington.
For a number of years various authors have suggested either the “group model”
or the “public interest model” for identifying organizational clients. As discussed in
Legler’s article, under the group model, an organization itself “shares” attorneys with
some or all of the individuals that comprise the organization. For example, a city
attorney could be said to represent the mayor, council, board of adjustment, civil
service commission, municipal court judge and any other city department. The group
model assumes all of the individual clients within the organization consent to the
lawyer’s representation of each, even in the face of conflict. But the group model
breaks down when an individual (e.g., the planning director) disagrees with another
individual or agency (e.g., the Office for Civil Rights, or the Planning Director), and
refuses to waive the conflict between the two. Even though the entity model is the
accepted approach in Washington State, there are instances when an officer has acted
on behalf of the public entity but is later individually sued along with that entity. It may
be appropriate for both the officer and the local government to share the same lawyer
because of their common interests. But the lawyer should advise both that officer and
the government (through its other authorized representatives) of the potential conflict
of interest inherent in advising both the entity and a constituent, describe the potential
risks of dual representation, inform the officer that if adversity later arose the lawyer
5

See Legler’s and Witkowski’s papers, supra note 1.
6 Legler is quoting from G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (2nd Edition 1993) (together with
later editions and supplements, “The Law of Lawyering”). The current edition of The Law of Lawyering is
the 3rd Edition 2001.
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002). Sarbanes-Oxley was known as
the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act" in the U.S. Senate, and the "Corporate and
Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act" in the House of Representatives.
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will represent the governmental body alone, and obtain the written consent of the dual
representation from both the officer and the government involved (acting through the
other appropriate officials).
A second alternative model, most often advocated by academics (and few
others), is the “public interest” model. This model is based on the belief that
government lawyers should act “in furtherance of the governmental and public
interest.” See, for example, University of New Mexico Law School Professor Maureen
Sanders, Government Attorneys and the Ethical Rules: Good Souls in Limbo, 7 BYU J.
Pub. L. 39, 77 (1993). In the public interest model, according to Sanders, either the
government’s or public’s interests are the public lawyer’s “client.” Obviously, a public
lawyer has an obligation to the public and participates in advancing the public interest. 8
But that begs the question of determining what the “public interest” is in any particular
transaction or dispute. The obvious concern with the “public interest” model is that the
attorney must determine, among other things, who the authorized representative of the
client is, what the public interest is, and then what position to take in order to further
that identified public interest. Depending on the constitutional and statutory
framework, this model may find some application in the criminal law or civil
enforcement context for an elected prosecutor or a state attorney general. But it is
impractical for most lawyers serving as in-house or outside legal counsel for a
municipality. As discussed below, for elected lawyers the public interest model raises
ethics issues and, in Washington, usually conflicts with statutory frameworks that
circumscribe elected law officers. Further, as Witkowski points out,9 many (including this
author) believe that “the very concept of ‘public interest’ is unintelligible and cannot
provide a workable guidepost for government attorneys.” Determining the “public
interest” is about as easy as identifying the content of “natural law” and trying to apply
it in day-to-day situations.
Washington courts have addressed from time to time the argument that
government lawyers are held to a higher standard than lawyers representing the private
sector (there are particular standards that apply to criminal prosecution that are not
addressed in this paper). When acting as regulator, the Washington Supreme Court has
stated that government is to act “scrupulously just” when dealing with its citizens. State
ex. rel. Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wn.2d 135, 143; 401 P.2d 635 (1965). But that
standard does not have a practical application in the normal course of a lawyer’s
representation of a government client. In Lybbert v. Grant County, the Washington State
Supreme Court held:10

8 See, The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, §97 (2007)(“Restatement”), Comment f:
“Courts have stressed that a lawyer representing a governmental client must seek to advance the public
interest in the representation and not merely the partisan or personal interests of the government entity
or officer involved….”
9 Witkowski, note 2, at 40.
10 141 Wn.2d 29, 37-38 (2000).

4-7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594386

While we agree with the basic proposition that the government should be just
when dealing with its citizens, we do not believe that an attorney representing
the government has a duty to maintain a standard of conduct that is higher than
that expected of an attorney for a private party. If we were to impose such a
heightened duty on an attorney for the government we would be creating a twotiered system of advocacy, one for legal representatives of the government and
the other for counsel of private parties.
While the entity model was not formally adopted until 2006 by the Washington State
Supreme Court, the Court’s 2000 decision in Lybbert signaled that municipal lawyers in
their civil representation would not be subject to a “public interest” model.
The entity model of representation is now “almost universally” accepted. The
Law of Lawyering, 17-11 (2004-2 Supplement). This universe includes Washington State.
Importantly, it was embodied in Washington State’s RPCs that became effective
September 1, 2006. The entity approach clearly applies to the representation of
governments. See, e.g., WSBA Ethics Advisory Opinion 2173 (2007)(“RPC 1.13 provides
that a lawyer employed by an organization represents the organization rather than its
constituent members. This rule applies to government organizations”). As noted above,
RPC 1.13 states simply in its initial sentence that “a lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.” However, after restating the prevalence of the entity approach today,
U.W. Professor Tom Andrews notes:11
The simplicity of the concept…belies the complexities in its application.
The challenge for a lawyer dealing with an organizational client, of
course, is that the organization can only speak through its employees and
agents, and ambiguities may arise regarding the duties owed to the legal
entity that is the organization, as opposed to those owed to the
constituents with whom the lawyer deals for direction and advice.
Under RPC 1.13(h), the duty to the entity under RPC 1.13 normally applies to
lawyers representing governmental organizations.
RPC 1.13, Comment [9]. But
Professor Andrews notes: “Whether the presumption set out in RPC 1.13(h) will help
resolve hard cases remains to be seen.”12 And Comment [9] to the RPC candidly
recognizes the dilemma for government lawyers:
Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting
obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the governmental
context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules.

11 Tom Andrews et al., The Law of Lawyering in Washington 4-3 (2012).
12 Id. at 4-4.
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In other words, RPC 1.13, Comment [9] essentially scratches its head in puzzlement. But
the confusion comes from trying to discern the “client” of the governmental lawyer,
when the answer is already clear: the entity is the client. As Hazard and Hodes put it in
The Law of Lawyering, the entity is the client but “can only interact with its lawyer
through human agents, [and] the legal construct is intended to be treated seriously, at
least so far as the client-lawyer relationship is concerned.”13 This means that while from
a day-to-day working standpoint we often treat a specific agency as “the client,” we
should never forget that the ultimate client is the entire entity (except for certain
circumstances under RPC 1.13(h) discussed below, when a private sector lawyer is
representing a specific agency.) And normally, a governmental entity carries out its
responsibilities through agencies and ultimately through natural persons who serve as
the authorized constituents. The importance of keeping the entity in mind as the
ultimate client is highlighted by the example of the mayor who is empowered, in the
instance of two departments in a dispute with one another, with the ability to order
them both to settle, or to order one to accede to the other’s demands. This is on-theground proof of the existence of a single entity client, notwithstanding the fact that the
lawyer treating each of the two departments viewed his or her department as the
“client.”14
So the only remaining question is who speaks for the entity client in any
particular situation. That question is not always so easy to answer.

Question:

Entities Aren’t Real People. They Don’t Talk. Who Speaks for
Them?

Answer:

“Duly Authorized Constituents” or “Representational
Authorities” (If you Can Find Them. Happy Hunting!)

The Restatement, at §§ 96 and 97, tries to address the problem. Under the
Restatement, when a lawyer is employed or retained to represent a governmental
organization, the interests of the organization (and the attorney’s role) are defined by
the organization’s “responsible agents acting pursuant to the organization’s decisionmaking procedures.” Correspondingly, the lawyer must follow the instructions as given
by governmental officials authorized to act on behalf of the organization. See
Comment b to Restatement § 97. But, “those who speak for the governmental client
may differ from one representation to another.” Restatement § 97 at Comment c. The
Restatement notes one succinct statement of the chain of authority: “A government
13 The Law of Lawyering at 17-6.
14 Governmental lawyers also need to be cautious when a representative of an entity client seeks to
“loan” them to an intergovernmental body of which the entity is a member. That intergovernmental
entity may be organized as a municipal corporation, a nonprofit corporation, an LLC, or a loose joint
board. But the intergovernmental grouping should be treated as a separate client, and appropriate
consents obtained. See, Hugh Spitzer, Ethics Issues in Representing Intergovernmental Entities,
Proceedings of the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, Spring Conference 5-1 (2014).
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lawyer must follow lawful directions of authorized superiors with respect to the scope
and implementation of the representation….” Restatement § 97 at Comment f.15
OK. How do we identify the “responsible agents”? Who are the “persons
authorized to act on behalf of the organization”? Note that the terms for these
responsible agents vary in the literature and in cases—we see them labeled variously as
“representational authorities,” “authorized representatives,” or “constituents.” But the
concept is the same—if a government lawyer’s client is “the state,” “the county,” “the
city” or “the district,” who makes the “client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation” under RPC 1.2? With whom does that lawyer consult as to the means by
which those objectives are to be pursued?
The comments to RPC 1.13 give several examples. Comment [9] to RPC 1.13
observes that sometimes “the client may be a specific agency,…a branch of government,
such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole.” If an action requiring legal
counsel involves a particular department head or “bureau” (i.e. a department), that
department may be treated as the client for purposes of the Rule. But the example
does not solve this riddle: in the event of a lawsuit involving a claim of police
misconduct, does the city attorney represent the individual officer? The police
department? The city? All of the above? Some of the above? And who, if anyone, is to
give direction to the city attorney?

One thing in the above-quoted language of Comment [9] causes conceptual confusion. It
is sloppily worded in terms of who the client is, which departs from the firm direction of
RPC 1.13 itself, which is that the entire entity is the client. The correct approach is to
think in terms of who is authorized to speak for the client in any particular situation. It
is true that there are situations where government agencies are adverse to each other,
and, as discussed below, we allow them separate representation (sometimes by the
same governmental law office). But we can reduce confusion by talking about the client
as, for example, “The City of Seattle acting through the City Light Department,” or “The
City of Seattle acting through the Department of Finance and Administrative Services.”
15 See also, Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1293, 1296, n. 7 (1987).
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The City is the single entity served by the lawyers representing each respective agency,
say, in a lease negotiation between those two agencies. But in that situation the
authorized representatives are different for each lawyer. Is this a distinction without a
difference—as lawyers don’t we treat the specific agency as the client from a practical
standpoint? The answer is “yes…but.” The “but” is the fact that in the example given,
the Mayor, as chief executive, can supersede a decision made by the director of either
department, for example ordering a specific settlement in a lease dispute. Even a
difference of opinion between different branches of government (executive versus
legislative) can be resolved in the next election by the ultimate decision-makers, the
voters.
In any event, we recognize that a government lawyer needs to determine who
makes the judgment calls on behalf of “the client.” Who is that? As usual, it depends. As
recognized by Comment [9] to RPC 1.13, and as thoughtfully laid out by Wayne
Witkowski,16 no one approach works in all circumstances. It depends on the
constitutional, statutory and charter framework. It depends on the character of the
work (e.g., tort litigation where a government litigator represents the public entity as a
whole, compared with a situation where a lawyer might serve as counselor to the
speaker of the house, or a city council, in connection with a dispute with the governor or
a mayor). In Witkowski’s words, the identity of the client (or client representative), and
the lawyer’s loyalty:17
…may change according to the lawyer’s role as advisor or litigator, the
subject matter, the interests represented, the bureaucratic hierarchy, the
lawyer’s statutory authority, the anticipated scope and nature of the
lawyer’s services, the practices of the office, and the political level of the
actors involved.
RPC 1.13(h) says that for a lawyer who is not a public officer or employee, a
“discrete governmental agency or unit” can be treated as a client unless that agency
provides otherwise in a written agreement or “the broader governmental entity gives
the lawyer timely written notice to the contrary.” Limiting a governmental client to a
single agency is convenient for private sector lawyers who represent a specific
department of the State or a local government. For example, a lawyer (and thus the
lawyer’s entire firm) representing the Department of Licensing, will not automatically
be treated as having a conflict if that firm files an unrelated lawsuit against the
Department of Health. RPC 1.13(h) had its origin in former RPC 1.7(c), adopted in 1995.
The commentary to that provision, when it was proposed, focused solely on outside
lawyers for the State of Washington and did not discuss the concept of single-agency
representation in the context of a local government. Most State of Washington
agencies are large, and interact with each other at arms’ length (often by interlocal
16 Witkowski, note 2, at 52.
17 Id.
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agreements under Chapter 39.34 RCW). In most circumstances an attorney who
represents one State department, such as the Department of Transportation, will not
learn confidential information that would be of any relevance to a client that is adverse
to another department, such as the Department of Social and Health Services.
Furthermore, the representation of one agency will typically not cause employees in
another department to feel betrayed if that attorney assists a client in suing an
unrelated State department. But many cities are noticeably different. The
departments are much smaller, and often deal with overlapping functions. They all
report to a city manager or a mayor. A private lawyer assisting a parks department
with three employees, may encounter difficulties representing another client who
desires to sue the public works department with five employees just down the hall
from the parks staff—and all of them share the same coffee maker in the same break
room! Only the largest cities and counties might feel comfortable routinely allowing
outside counsel for one department to assist other clients adverse to separate agencies
of those cities and counties. It might be appropriate for RPC 1.13(h) to be adjusted so
that it is applicable solely to lawyers representing agencies of the State of Washington.
In addition, RPC 1.13(h) provides no guidance for lawyers who are public officers
or employees, i.e., who not outside private firm lawyers. For that, they must wend
their way to RPC 1.11, which primarily (but not entirely) deals with conflicts created by
attorneys moving in and out of government positions.18 Comment [2] to RPC 1.11 tells
us that because of “the special problems raised by imputation within a government
agency, paragraph (d) does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an
officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or
employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.” This provides
the RPC basis for the standard practice of separating (“screening”) lawyers and
divisions within the Attorney General’s office—an office that often represents agencies
that are adverse to one another. It would be helpful to have more explicit language in
RPC 1.13 that addresses the common phenomenon of lawyers within a public law office
representing separate departments adverse to each other. But Comment [2] to RPC
1.11 probably does the job.19

18

On March 19, 2015, the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association approved proposed
amendments to RPC 1.10 and 1.11 to clarify that public defenders represent individuals rather than their
governmental employees and are therefore subject to Rule 1.10 rather than Rule 1.11. These proposed changes
are being submitted to the Washington State Supreme Court for its consideration.
19 Joint representation of criminal defendants is particularly troublesome and “bears a high likelihood of giving
rise to a consentable conflict of interest involving direct adverseness.” Tom Andrews et al., The Law of Lawyering in
Washington 7-16 to 7-17 (2012). Recently the State Supreme Court held that attorneys with competing nonprofit
public defender agencies in King County were to be deemed “county employees” eligible for retirement benefits.
Dolan v. King County, 172 Wash.2d 299 (2011). This decision led to the realization that as county employees, those
defenders, formerly in separate “firms” (see RPC 1.0(c)) might now all be in the same firm and representing
criminal defendants adverse to one another. Consequently, the Court has been asked to consider a new Comment
[13] to RPC 1.0(c) which would provide that a subdivision of an organization employing lawyers who represent
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Finally, a lawyer for any entity should bear in mind that whoever is the
representational authority on a day-to-day basis, RPC 1.13(b) requires that if a lawyer
for an organization knows that an officer or employee of the entity is violating the law,
that attorney normally must “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted…to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.” Under RPC 1.13(c), under some
circumstances that lawyer may reveal confidential information to law enforcement
agencies if the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to prevent substantial injury to
the organization.

Question:

Don’t Statutes and Charters Often Identify the Authorized
Representative of a Local Government?

Answer:

Yes. (Sometimes)

In Washington State, a law officer’s responsibilities and the identity of the client’s
authorized representative “is dependent upon the constitution and statutes of
Washington,”20 and, in the case of a first-class city, by the charter.
There are often answers to the conundrum in statutes relating to local
governments. For example, for code cities that use the council-manager form of
government, there is little doubt that in most cases the manager will be the authorized
representative who has the power to decide upon a course of action. RCW 35A.13.120.
But the city manager reports to the council, and most city managers regularly consult
with their councils and seek direction on major litigation decisions. A city council
ultimately has the authority to approve lawsuits, including in those code cities that use
the mayor-council (“strong mayor”) form of government. RCW 35A.12.100.21
Many cities contract for legal services. See RCW 35A.12.020. Most cities
contract through and under the authority of the city council. RCW 35A.11.010. But the
authority of the council to contract for legal services cannot deprive the mayor of the
right to such services. This is addressed by the Office of Attorney General in AGO 1997
No. 7. There the Attorney General recognized that the mayor is the “chief executive and
administrative officer of the city,” citing RCW 35A.12.100.

indigent members of the public is to be considered a separate law firm if it is fully independent from other similar
units of the organization, including physical separation and no shared access to client information.
20 State v. Herrmann, 89 Wn.2d 349, 352, 572 P.2d 713 (1977).
21

It should be noted that sometimes specialized city boards or commissions might have statutory authority to give
direction to a city attorney within the subject matter domain of those boards. For example, under RCW 41.08.140
and RCW 41.12.140, police and fire civil service commissions are vested with the responsibility to “to begin and
conduct all civil suits which may be necessary for the proper enforcement” of those chapters, with the “chief legal
officer of the city” being charged with representing each commission in its enforcement actions.
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That the mayor will require legal services from time to time in fulfilling
official duties cannot seriously be questioned. Nothing in chapter 35A.12
RCW authorizes the city council to exercise general supervision over the
mayor’s performance of these duties…
For these reasons we conclude the city council generally lacks authority
to contract for the provision of legal services solely under the direction of
the city council.
AGO 1997 No. 7 at 4. The Attorney General Opinion balances the executive authority of
the mayor over ongoing administration of the city, with that of the city council’s
authority to contract. The authority to contract did not limit the mayor’s power to serve
as the “officer who has the legitimate power to decide upon a course of action” within
the scope of that executive authority. The city attorney must follow that direction
under the entity model. If the council disagrees with the mayor (and the city attorney)
in such circumstances, the council may be faced with the difficult question of its
authority to engage separate legal counsel. For an example of such a situation see State
ex. rel. Steilacoom Town Council v. Volkmer, supra (Supreme Court found city council
without authority to pay for outside legal services).
For a first class city, charter provisions can add an overlay to whatever statutes or
RPCs control an elected city attorney’s responsibilities to his or her municipal client. One
of the most interesting examples of this is provided by Seattle’s charter, which currently
states, at Art. XIII, §3:22
The City Attorney shall have full supervisory control of all the litigation of
the City, or in which the City or any of its departments are interested, and
shall perform such other duties as are or shall be prescribed by ordinance.
No state statute prescribes the powers of the city attorney of a first class city, so it is left to
the charter (and in some instances, to ordinance) to outline that officer’s duties. Versions
of Seattle’s charter since 1890 provided the city’s Corporation Counsel (now, “City
Attorney”) fairly strong control over litigation. Some type of disagreement over the control
of litigation between the Corporation Counsel and the City Council led the latter body in
1913 to propose a charter amendment that would have enabled the Corporation Counsel
to institute lawsuits only “upon direction of the city council.”23 The then-Corporation
Counsel spoke out vociferously against the proposal,24 and it was defeated by a three-totwo margin.25 Voter rejection of the Council’s proposal suggests that the Seattle charter
22 The Charter of The City of Seattle, adopted 1946, amended through November 5, 2013, Article XIII, Sec
3.
23 Seattle City Council Resolution 4282 (1913).
24 “Corporation Counsel Opposes Amendment,” Seattle Times, March 2, 1914, p. 9.
25 Election Results reported in Seattle Times, March 5, 1914, p.5.
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language giving the city attorney “full supervisory control of all the litigation” suggests that
the city attorney might have more control over the course of city litigation than does the
Attorney General with respect to some types of state litigation.
A city attorney legitimately may reject (as a matter of law, but perhaps not for
political considerations) a request for legal services by an individual councilmember. In
Ethics Opinion 2002-02 (2002), the Rhode Island Supreme Court applied that state’s RPC
1.13 and held that the city attorney’s client was the council as a whole. As a result, the
municipal lawyer could comply with the council’s request for a redacted itemized
statement of prior bills, but the lawyer could not comply with an individual
councilmember’s requests for unredacted bills unless the full council, which was the
client, consented. See Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 228 (ABA, 6th
Edition 2007). Lawyers may often draft ordinances at an individual councilmember’s
request. But the city, not an individual councilmember, controls the provision of legal
services.
The basic duties of county prosecuting attorneys in Washington State are set forth
in RCW 36.27.020. Those responsibilities include, among other things: serving as the legal
adviser of the county commissioners or council “when required by the legislative authority
or the chairperson thereof;” advising school districts; representing the state, county and
school districts in criminal and civil proceedings, “subject to the supervisory control and
direction of the attorney general;” and seeking “to reform and improve the
administration of criminal justice.” In addition, at Chapter 36.27 RCW the Code Reviser
cross-references more than 65 other statutes that prescribe various duties to the
prosecuting attorney. These include everything from approving professional baseball
contracts with minors (RCW 67.04.110) to enforcing weed control district regulations
(RCW 17.04.210). But most of these do not provide express guidance as to whom a
prosecutor should treat as the authorized representative of the various county and
district clients.
In the civil context, a majority of the board of county commissioners may direct a
certain course of action. The board (or a county council) can even employ legal counsel
separate from the elected prosecutor, but that requires court approval. RCW 36.32.200.
See, AGLO 1974 No. 69 (authority to contract for legal services limited to the term of the
board). See also, State ex. rel. Steilacoom Town Council v. Volkmer, 73 Wn. App. 89 867
P2d 678 (1994); Tukwila v. Todd 17 Wn. App. 401, 563 P2d. 223 (1977) (setting forth
standards when a city council may hire its own lawyer and pay for such legal services,
separate from the city attorney). It is unlikely that an individual commissioner would be
a separate client, unless named separately in a lawsuit. In such an event the
prosecuting attorney would determine whether the office of prosecuting attorney could
represent the commissioner, without creating conflict with representation of the client
county. As noted above, if the prosecuting attorney represents both the officer and the
county, it is important to advise both that officer and the other commissioners of the
potential conflict, describe the potential risks of dual representation, inform the officer
4-15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594386

that if adversity later arose the prosecutor would represent the county alone, and
obtain a written consent letter from both the officer and the county (acting through the
other county commissioners).
In sum, a prosecuting attorney needs to consult statutes and county charters (when
applicable), and then consider both who the client is (a county or a special district, or even
the state) and the context of the matter in order to nail down the identity of the client and
the authorized constituent.

Question:

The AG is an Independently Elected Official, So He Can Do
Whatever He Wants, Right?

Answer:

Wrong. (In Washington, Attorney General’s Duties and Source
of Client Direction Are Circumscribed by State Law.)

There have been several Washington cases addressing the extent of the elected
Attorney General’s authority to control litigation, most recently Goldmark v. McKenna,26
which in 2011 held that the Attorney General could not decline the Commissioner of Public
Lands’ request to appeal a case that the Department of Natural Resources had lost in trial
court. But before discussing Goldmark v. McKenna, it is worth reviewing an earlier case,
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas & Electric Co.,27 which held that the Attorney
General, having no common law powers but only statutory, powers, could not on his own
commence a quo warranto proceeding to determine whether a corporation exercising a
public franchise had usurped its authority. Seattle Gas & Electric further held that the
authority to bring such a proceeding rested with a county’s prosecuting attorney. In his
opinion, Justice William White wrote:28
The appellant assumes that the attorney general of this state, by virtue of
his office, is, like the attorney general of England, clothed with common-law
power to institute this suit, as it was the duty of the attorney general under
the common law to represent the crown in such actions as this, and that
therefore the attorney general of this state on his own motion can institute
this suit. Political power in this state inheres in the people, and by
constitutional or statutory authority the exercise of this power in behalf of
the people is delegated to certain officers. In the exercise of power the
officer is controlled by the law theretofore declared. The attorney general
of the state, although bearing the same title as the attorney general of
England, is not a common-law officer. There is nothing in a mere name.
26 Goldmark v. McKenna, 172 Wn.2d 568, 259 P.3d 1095 (2011).
27 28 Wash. 488, 68 P. 946 (1902). See also, State ex rel. Hamilton v. Superior Court of Whatcom County, 3
Wn.2d 633, 101 P.2d 588 (1940).
28 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Seattle Gas & Electric Co., 28 Wash. at 495-96, 68 P. at 949.
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Because the particular office filled by the relator is called the office of
‘attorney general,’ it does not follow therefrom that he has the same
powers as the attorney general of England under the common law. Every
office under our system of government, from the governor down, is one of
delegated powers. ‘It is a well-settled doctrine that officers of the state
exercise but delegated power, and this is particularly true of the attorney
general. His office is created by statute, and he, as such officer, can only
exercise such power as is delegated to him by statute.
Justice White’s opinion thus held that the Attorney General cannot be his “own client”
except when authorized by statute. This provides background to Goldmark v. McKenna,
which arose because the Attorney General refused to appeal a superior court ruling that
the Okanogan Public Utility District had sufficient authority to condemn a power line rightof-way over DNR-managed land. Presumably, the Attorney General declined to take the
matter to an appellate court because his office had determined that there was not
sufficient merit to an appeal. The Attorney General’s Office never explicitly said why they
preferred not to continue the case—presumably they concluded that they would commit
an RPC 1.6 confidentiality violation if they made the reason public, and perhaps also injure
the client commissioner’s interests if an appeal proceeded (an RPC 1.7 duty-of-loyalty
violation). A June 8, 2010 press release from that office hinted slightly at the reason, but no
more than that. (“This decision was thoroughly processed in the manner in which we
handle all appeal decisions. The legal underpinnings of an appeal were researched and
analyzed by attorneys assigned to DNR and by our Solicitor General’s Office, staffed by
some of the finest appellate lawyers in the nation.”)
The decision not to appeal the Okanogan County Superior Court decision was based, as all
of our appellate decisions are, on whether legal error was made by the trial court judge,
consideration of the trial court record, and the likelihood of the appeal’s success. This
process for handling appeals has been in place for many years.
The Washington State Constitution, at Art. III, §21, says simply that the Attorney
General “shall be the legal adviser of the state officers, and shall perform such other duties
as may be prescribed by law.” But the relevant statute, RCW 43.12.075, explicitly
prescribed the Attorney General’s duties with respect to the Commissioner of Public Lands:
“It shall be the duty of the attorney general, to institute, or defend, any action or
proceeding to which the state, or the commissioner…is or may be a party….when
requested so to do by the commissioner…or upon the attorney general’s own initiative.”29
In Goldmark v. McKenna, the Attorney General argued that because the statute authorized
him to institute or to defend an action upon his own initiative, he could affirmatively act
over the commissioner’s objection. Justice Charles Johnson’s opinion rejected that
argument.

29 Quoted at 172 Wn.2d 572.
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The Court also rejected the assertion that because Washington’s constitution
names the Attorney General as the state’s chief legal officer, and independently elected,
he could serve as a check on other elected officers.30 Justice Johnson’s opinion stated that
“there is nothing inherent in this structure that permits the attorney general to refuse to
represent state officers when statutorily required to do so. It simply means that he may
also institute proceeds against state officers in other situations.”31 At the end of that
sentence we find one of the most interesting aspects of the court’s opinion in Goldmark v.
McKenna, footnote 5, which directly addressed the ethics issues involved in determining
whether such a public attorney must follow the legitimate directives of the authorized
representative of a client agency:32
Moreover, the attorney general, like every lawyer in the state, is bound by
RPC 1.2(a), which provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation” and “shall abide by a client's
decision whether to settle a matter.” If the attorney general feels unable to
do so, then he has the authority to appoint a SAAG under RCW 43.10.065 so
the state officer is still provided with counsel. The attorney general argues
that an appointed SAAG would have the same ethical obligations as the
attorney general, and so would also be precluded from pursuing a harmful
appeal. But RPC 1.13(h) provides a private lawyer's client would only be the
particular agency, not the broader governmental entity, unless otherwise
notified by the chief legal officer of the broader governmental entity. This
implies that the attorney general may enlarge the scope of the private
lawyer's attorney-client relationship, but need not do so.
The bottom line is that in the applicable statutory context, the Attorney General was
required to “abide by [the] client’s decisions” concerning the appeal, and could not
substitute his judgment.33 Justice Gerry Alexander’s concurring opinion pointed out that
the Attorney General, consistent with RPC 3.1, “should…have discretion to decline such
representation if the appeal is frivolous.” We hope that this is obvious, and that others on
the Court would agree with Justice Alexander’s position. We simply do not know why
Justice Johnson did not include a similar statement in his majority opinion.
On the same day that Goldmark v. McKenna was decided the Washington Supreme
Court ruled in Seattle v. McKenna34 that the Attorney General had sufficient statutory
30 172 Wn.2d at 579.
31 172 Wn.2d at 579-80.
32 172 Wn.2d at 580, note 5.
33 In the underlying case that sparked Goldmark v. McKenna, the Commissioner of Public Lands
proceeded with his appeal, represented by a private sector lawyer appointed as a special assistant
attorney general. The appeal was unsuccessful, and the State Supreme Court unanimously ruled in 2015
that the Okanogan Public Utility District had ample statutory authority to condemn the right-of-way it
desired. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. State, ___Wn.2d ___, 342 P.3d 308 (2015).
34 172 Wn.2d 551, 259 P.2d 1087 (2011).
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authority to join the State of Washington as a party to a multi-state lawsuit challenging the
Affordable Care Act.35 The decision in Seattle v. McKenna reiterated that the Attorney
General was without common law powers, but reasoned that there was enough basis in
existing statutes to enable him to determine on his own to appear on behalf of the State in
that litigation.36 The Court also held that since he had that authority, and thus had no duty
to withdraw the State from the multistate litigation, the City of Seattle’s mandamus action
must fail. The decision in Seattle v. McKenna suggests that at least in some circumstances,
the Attorney General has enough statutory authority to be the “authorized representative”
for the State and to make the key calls with respect to litigation. Interestingly, and as we
shall next see, the elected City Attorney in Seattle also serves as the authorized
representative in some instances.

Question:

Can an Independently-elected Law Officer, Like the AG, Be
the Authorized Representative of a Governmental Entity?

Answer:

Sometimes.

In most instances the elected Attorney General, a prosecuting attorney and a city
attorney will have his/her client and the identity of the client’s authorized representative,
determined by statute and/or charter provisions. And usually that authorized constituent
is someone other than the elected law officer himself or herself. But in a limited set of
circumstances, that elected law officer is authorized or even directed by statute to be the
decision-maker. This does not mean that the elected legal official is the client. As the saying

35

172 Wn.2d at 563.
Id. In Seattle v. McKenna, the Court relied on RCW 43.10.030, which provides that the Attorney General shall appear
and represent the state before various appeal courts. It should be noted that the next statute, RCW 43.10.040, states
that the Attorney General represents the state and all officials and agencies in the courts, administrative tribunals, and
“in all legal or quasi legal matters….” This raises the question of the status of lawyers who are not attorneys general but
who serve within various state agencies, often dispensing legal advice. Presumably such a non-AG lawyer should treat
the specific agency as his or her “client” for RPC purposes. But in a December 20, 2013, memorandum to all state
agency directors, Nicholas Brown, General Counsel to the Governor, warned that “state law prohibits state agencies
from hiring attorneys as ‘in-house counsel,’ ‘staff attorneys,’ or in any other role as a legal advisor.” Browned warned
that as a consequence, “communications between agency employees, including employees who are lawyers, are
generally not covered by attorney-client privilege.” He emphasized that only the Attorney General’s Office should be
relied upon for legal advice. Warnings like Mr. Brown’s are periodically issued to Washington State agencies, which
nevertheless continue to engage lawyers as staff members because of their legal knowledge and experience. One
interesting issue to consider is whether, if state law truly prohibits agencies from obtaining legal counsel from anyone
other than an attorney general, the agency “in-house” lawyers are engaging in a violation of RPC 8.4. This author
believes that the answer is: probably not. Such a representation does not appear to be a criminal act prohibited by RPC
8.4(b), nor does it constitute dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation as prohibited by RPC 8.4(c). Those
representations, being so common, likely do constitute violations of practice norms and thus do not constitute
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” prohibited by RPC 8.4(d). Finally, RPC 8.4(i)’s ban on acts that
reflect “disregard for the rule of law” probably does not extend to this conduct because the Court has been cautious in
its application of that vague concept. See In re Curran, 115 Wn.2d 747, 801 P.2d 962 (1990). See generally, Tom
Andrews et al., The Law of Lawyering in Washington 12-9 to 12-24 (2012).
36
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goes: “Every man who is his own lawyer, has a fool for a client.”37 The client is the State, or
a county, or a city, or a special district. But the elected lawyer is on occasion designated by
statute to supervise operations in a specified area of law or administration, and in that
instance he or she is the authorized constituent/representative of the client.
The most obvious example is in the area of criminal prosecutions. Under RCW
36.27.020(6), county prosecutors are made responsible to “institute and prosecute
proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably
suspected of felonies when the prosecuting attorney has information that any such offense
has been committed.” This appears to be a sufficient grant of authority to the prosecutor
to decide whether and when to bring charges—indeed, it would not make any sense for a
prosecuting attorney to be required to consult with county commissioners, councils or
county executives as to whether a charge is appropriate. The Restatement §97(1)
recognizes this and notes that a lawyer representing the government might possess “such
rights and responsibilities as may defined by law to make decisions on behalf of the
governmental client….”
City attorneys do not have a general statute vesting in them the authority to
control the prosecution of misdemeanors and civil infractions. The second class city statute
has a general description of a city attorney’s duties (RCW 35.23.111: “He or she shall
represent the city in all actions brought by or against the city or against city officials in their
official capacity.”) Through RCW 35A.11.020, code cities may take advantage of this, but
that is optional. There are a few statutes expressly authorizing city prosecutors to decide
when to prosecute malfeasors—for example, to maintain actions to abate nuisances (RCW
7.48.058 and RCW 7.48A.030); to bring actions against unlawful copycat musical
performances (RCW 19.25.100); or to petition for a special inquiry judge during a criminal
investigation (RCW 10.27.170). As noted above regarding Seattle, city charters sometimes
provide clarity. Ordinances on occasion provide general authority. (See Kent City Code
§2.20.040: “The city attorney shall supervise the representation of the city in all actions
brought by or against the city….The city attorney shall have complete charge of all of the
work of the legal department.”) Or an ordinance might vest the city attorney with
discretion with respect to a specific type of action. (See Bellevue City Code §9.20.050
regarding fair housing actions, or Kirkland City Code §11.24.080 relating to recovery of
nuisance abatement costs. But cf. Bellevue City Code §9.10A.040 giving the police chief
the decision over whether to refer a “chronic nuisance” to the city attorney for action.) In
order to provide clarity about a city attorney’s prosecutorial discretion, it may be prudent
for cities to insert provisions in their codes providing the city attorney with general
authority to supervise and control legal actions, particularly the filing and prosecution of
criminal and civil infraction actions. In considering such an ordinance, a city council might

37 Henry Kett, The Flowers of Wit, or a Choice Collection of Bon Mots (1814).

4-20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2594386

evaluate how broad the city attorney’s discretion should be. Presumably the greatest
discretion should be vested in the city attorney in criminal and civil infraction matters.
At the state level, there is a particularly notable example of a specific statute
vesting the elected Attorney General with administrative control over certain regulatory
activities. Under RCW 19.86.080, the Attorney General “may bring an action in the name
of the state” for enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act. RCW 19.86.085 establishes
a consumer protection unit within the Attorney General’s office. Consequently, it is
appropriate to think of the Attorney General as the authorized constituent of the State for
purposes of that statute. This does not mean that the Attorney General is his or her “own
client,” but simply that he or she makes the policy calls and makes the “client decisions”
under RPC 1.2.

Question:

What’s the Bottom Line?

Answer:

Stick to the Entity Model (And Normally Look to Someone Else
Besides a Lawyer to Make the Calls for the Client)

In this author’s view, because Washington firmly follows the “entity model” of
identifying public lawyers’ clients, an elected law officer is not his or her own client.
Instead, the governmental entity itself is the client—the State, a county, a city, or a district.
Under limited circumstances, RPC 1.13(h) permits a private sector lawyer to treat a specific
governmental department as the client, and not the entire entity. And, just because the
Attorney General or a prosecuting attorney is elected, doesn’t mean that the electors, or
“the public” or “the public interest” is the client instead of the governmental entity.
Lawyers represent clients and receive direction from clients. Since entity clients are
inanimate, that direction must be provided by natural persons, i.e., the duly authorized
constituent/representational authority/authorized representative who serves as the
decision-maker and the voice of the client. If a governmental law officer ignores that client
representative’s lawful advice, he or she runs the risk of violating RPC 1.2. Who that
authorized representative is will depend in large part on the situational facts and the
relevant statutory framework. Only when a statute, charter or ordinance vests explicit line
responsibility for a program in an elected law officer (most notably in the criminal
prosecution arena) does that lawyer become the authorized constituent who makes the
policy calls.
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